On March 27, 1977, a date forever etched in the annals of aviation history, the world witnessed a tragedy of unimaginable proportions—the Tenerife Airport disaster. On that fateful Sunday, amidst the thick shroud of fog at Los Rodeos Airport, now known as Tenerife North Airport, chaos unfolded as two colossal Boeing 747 jumbo jets collided on the runway. One was a KLM flight, the other a Pan Am flight. In a horrific turn of events, 583 lives were tragically cut short, leaving scars on families and a haunting shadow over aviation safety that still resonates today.
Ironically, neither KLM Flight 4805 nor Pan Am Flight 1736 was originally destined for Tenerife. Both flights were en route to Gran Canaria Airport in Las Palmas. However, earlier that day, a terrorist bomb exploded in the terminal at Gran Canaria, leading to its closure and the diversion of numerous incoming flights, including the two 747s, to the smaller Los Rodeos Airport in Tenerife.
The usually quiet airport quickly became congested as diverted aircraft occupied the parking areas and the single taxiway. This forced departing planes to use the runway for taxiing. Adding to the complexity, patches of thick fog began to drift across the airfield, severely reducing visibility for both pilots and the air traffic control tower.
Tenerife Airport Incident Planes
KLM Flight 4805, a Boeing 747-206B named “Rijn,” had arrived from Amsterdam with 248 passengers and crew. The captain, Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten, was KLM’s chief flight instructor, a highly experienced pilot. While waiting for Las Palmas to reopen, the passengers disembarked and waited in the small Tenerife terminal. The KLM crew, particularly Captain Van Zanten, were reportedly concerned about adhering to Dutch regulations regarding flight crew duty time. To avoid potential delays in Las Palmas, Captain Van Zanten decided to take on a full load of fuel in Tenerife, making the aircraft significantly heavier and requiring a longer takeoff distance.
Pan Am Flight 1736, a Boeing 747-121 named “Clipper Victor,” had originated in Los Angeles with a stopover in New York, carrying 396 passengers and crew. Captain Victor Grubbs, a seasoned pilot with extensive flying hours, was in command. The Pan Am passengers remained on board during the delay.
As the fog thickened, the control tower instructed the KLM 747 to taxi down the entire length of the runway and then make a 180-degree turn to get into takeoff position. The Pan Am was instructed to follow and taxi down the same runway, exiting at the third intersection (taxiway C-3) to clear the runway for the KLM takeoff.
Here, a series of critical misunderstandings and unfortunate circumstances began to unfold. The fog made it extremely difficult for the Pan Am crew to locate taxiway C-3; they proceeded past it, intending to use the next one, C-4. At the same time, the KLM crew, possibly influenced by the captain’s concern about duty time and the worsening weather, misinterpreted a radio communication.
The co-pilot, Klaas Meurs, read back their route clearance, ending with the phrase, “We are now at take-off”. The controller, who had not issued takeoff clearance, responded with “Okay,” followed by instructions to “stand by for take-off, I will call you”. This response was ambiguous and further contributed to the KLM captain’s fatal misbelief that he had been cleared for takeoff.
Ignoring the “stand by” instruction, Captain Van Zanten initiated the takeoff roll in the dense fog. The Pan Am crew, still taxiing on the runway and heading in the opposite direction, suddenly saw the massive KLM 747 emerge from the fog, speeding towards them. Captain Grubbs of the Pan Am reacted instantly, applying full throttle and attempting to steer his aircraft off the runway to the left, onto the grass.
The Collision at Tenerife Airport
The KLM aircraft, despite a last-second attempt to lift off, struck the Pan Am 747 at an angle. The impact was catastrophic. The KLM’s lower fuselage and main landing gear tore through the upper fuselage of the Pan Am, ripping it apart. Both aircraft erupted in flames.
Tragically, all 248 people on board the KLM flight perished in the inferno. On the Pan Am, 335 people lost their lives. However, 61 passengers and crew members in the forward section of the Pan Am aircraft survived the initial impact and fire, managing to escape through holes in the fuselage and onto the left wing.
The Tenerife airport disaster sent shockwaves through the aviation industry and led to significant changes in safety regulations and cockpit procedures worldwide. The investigation highlighted the critical importance of standardized English phraseology in radio communications between air traffic control and flight crews. It also emphasized the need for improved crew resource management (CRM), promoting a more collaborative decision-making environment within the cockpit, regardless of hierarchy.
The Tenerife Airport disaster serves as a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of miscommunication, human error, and the unforgiving nature of aviation in adverse conditions.
